The logic of political survival /
de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno,
The logic of political survival / Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow - xiii, 536 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
Includes bibliographical references (pages 503-518) and index
I: A theory of political incentives -- 1. Reigning in the prince -- 2. The theory: definitions and intuition -- 3. A model of the selectorate theory -- II: Policy choice and political survival -- 4. Institutions for Kleptocracy or growth -- 5. Institutions, peace, and prosperity -- 6. War, peace, and coalition size -- 7. Political survival -- III: Choosing institutions -- 8. Institutional preferences: change from within -- 9. The enemy outside and within: war and changes of leaders and regimes -- 10. Promoting peace and prosperity
"The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically."--Jacket
9780262524407 0262524406 0262025469 9780262025461
GBA517807 bnb
Heads of state--Succession
Heads of state--Term of office
Political planning
JF285 / .B78 2003
The logic of political survival / Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow - xiii, 536 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
Includes bibliographical references (pages 503-518) and index
I: A theory of political incentives -- 1. Reigning in the prince -- 2. The theory: definitions and intuition -- 3. A model of the selectorate theory -- II: Policy choice and political survival -- 4. Institutions for Kleptocracy or growth -- 5. Institutions, peace, and prosperity -- 6. War, peace, and coalition size -- 7. Political survival -- III: Choosing institutions -- 8. Institutional preferences: change from within -- 9. The enemy outside and within: war and changes of leaders and regimes -- 10. Promoting peace and prosperity
"The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically."--Jacket
9780262524407 0262524406 0262025469 9780262025461
GBA517807 bnb
Heads of state--Succession
Heads of state--Term of office
Political planning
JF285 / .B78 2003