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The logic of political survival / Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextPublisher: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 2003Copyright date: c2003Description: xiii, 536 pages : illustrations ; 24 cmContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISBN:
  • 9780262524407
  • 0262524406
  • 0262025469
  • 9780262025461
Subject(s): LOC classification:
  • JF285 .B78 2003
Contents:
I: A theory of political incentives -- 1. Reigning in the prince -- 2. The theory: definitions and intuition -- 3. A model of the selectorate theory -- II: Policy choice and political survival -- 4. Institutions for Kleptocracy or growth -- 5. Institutions, peace, and prosperity -- 6. War, peace, and coalition size -- 7. Political survival -- III: Choosing institutions -- 8. Institutional preferences: change from within -- 9. The enemy outside and within: war and changes of leaders and regimes -- 10. Promoting peace and prosperity
Review: "The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically."--Jacket
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Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Status Date due Barcode
Books - Printed PERPUSTAKAAN GUNASAMA HAB PENDIDIKAN TINGGI PAGOH Main Library General JF285 .B78 2003 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Available SF0000746

Includes bibliographical references (pages 503-518) and index

I: A theory of political incentives -- 1. Reigning in the prince -- 2. The theory: definitions and intuition -- 3. A model of the selectorate theory -- II: Policy choice and political survival -- 4. Institutions for Kleptocracy or growth -- 5. Institutions, peace, and prosperity -- 6. War, peace, and coalition size -- 7. Political survival -- III: Choosing institutions -- 8. Institutional preferences: change from within -- 9. The enemy outside and within: war and changes of leaders and regimes -- 10. Promoting peace and prosperity

"The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically."--Jacket

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